It is widely assumed that selection history accounts of function can support a fully reductive naturalization of functional properties. I argue that this assumption is false. A problem with the alternative causal role account of function in this context is that it invokes the teleological notion of a goal in analysing real function. The selection history account, if it is to have reductive status, must not do the same. But attention to certain cases of selection history in biology, specifically those (...) involving meiotic drive, shows that selection historical explanations are available in the case of items without any plausible function. Making contributions to goals, here fitness, must be introduced as an additional constraint in the analysis, either explicitly, or implicitly by appeal to individual functions or the selection-of/selection-for distinction. (shrink)

PLATO'S UNIVERSE by Gregory Vlastos. Clarendon Press: O.U.P., 1975. xiii+130 pp. £3.75.

Donald Davidson infamously claims that belief is in its nature veridical, and that skepticism is for this reason fundamentally incoherent. To those who take the issue of external world skepticism seriously, Davidson's arguments may seem to involve a conjuring trick. In particular, his invocation of an ‘omniscient interpreter’, whose intelligibility supposedly ensures that our beliefs must be largely true, has the air of incense and lantern-rubbing about it. Davidson's claim has received considerable critical response in the literature, almost all of (...) it negative. In my view, some commentators have indeed lit on a critical and controversial lemma in Davidson's argument, but this basic result has been obscured by being presented amidst an array of other criticisms that simply make no sense from a Davidsonian point of view. The aim of this paper is to clear away some of the confusion that stands in the way of a more productive evaluation of Davidson's important claim. (shrink)

I examine the arguments Donald Davidson has offered through the years concerning the ontological bona fides of facts. In “Truth and Meaning”, Davidson uses the so-called “slingshot” argument to the effect that if true sentences refer, then they are all coreferential. Through a detailed examination of the assumptions underlying this argument, I show that, while it is effective as part of a reductio of bottom-up, reference based semantics, it has no tendency to establish the truth of its negative conclusion concerning (...) the existence of facts. Davidson also argues against facts by claiming they are of no help in the explication of truth. I claim that his repeated invocation of the slingshot in this context, as well as of arguments from other authors employing assumptions similar to the slingshot's, is inappropriate, especially in light of his own commitment to a top-down semantics — a committment inspired, ironically, by the reductio offered in “Truth and Meaning”. Davidson's other argument against truth as correspondence, namely that our grasp of facts is no better than our grasp of truths, is sound. But this argument does not show that there are no facts; it shows only that no theory of truth in terms of corre- pondence to facts can genuinely illuminate its explanandum. (shrink)

All that we see, all that we touch, all that we perceive, are naught but ideas. There are trees and rivers, to be sure, but these are simply collections of ideas. Is everything, then, in this world an idea or made up of ideas? No. I, for one, am not an idea. Besides ideas there are spirits. I know that I, an active being, exist. It would seem that to know this and to know God exists, nay even for there (...) to be any meaning in what I say when I use the words “I,” “God,” and “spirit,” I would have to have an idea of myself, an idea of God, and an idea of spirit. But this cannot be. Ideas are essentially passive and inert. Spriits are essentially active. How, then, could an idea represent or be an image of a spirit? And what sense is there to something being an idea if it does not represent its object? How, then, can my discourse about spirits have any meaning at all? I have a notion of spirit. (shrink)

In this book, Della Rocca traces out the conceptual links between key concepts and principles of Spinoza's system bearing on representation and the mind-body problem. In the course of doing so, he presents and defends a number of new, interesting theses about Spinoza's thought on these matters. The arguments are presented with impressive clarity and in great detail. All in all, the book is a significant contribution to the literature on Spinoza's metaphysics and epistemology, and should be read by anyone (...) with a serious interest in its historical subject or in the two perennial philosophical problems on which it focuses. (shrink)

The paper argues that Israel Kirzner’s theory of entrepreneurship has been influential on a number of related “dynamic” theories of organization. Kirzner’s theory is animated by a dual concern – the process of rentseeking behavior and the fundamental incompletness of knowledge. Placed in a technological and institutional context, this theory points to the importance of dynamic transaction costs: the coordination costs of acting upon an innovative rent-seeking opportunity. In some contexts, this kind of cost can explain vertical integration; in other (...) contexts, it can explain the reverse phenomenon: vertical disintegration.Cet article soutient que la théorie de l’entrepreneur d’Israel Kirzner a influencé un grand nombre de théories dynamiques de l’organisation. La théorie kirznerienne est animée par un objectif double : – le processus de comportement de recherche de rente et l’incomplétude fondamentale de la connaissance. Replacée dans un contexte technologique et institutionnel, cette théorie souligne l’importance des coûts de transaction dynamiques : les coûts de transaction liés à une opportunité dans la recherche de rente innovante. Dans certaines situations, cette catégorie de coûts peut expliquer l’intégration verticale ; dans d’autres, elle peut expliquer le phénomène inverse : la désintégration verticale. (shrink)

Reviews in allegory the approaches taken to the problem of agency by contemporary perspectives in psychology and broader intellectual tradition. The author argues that agency can only be rendered sensible or possible where there is freedom from traditional determinisms and where there is real moral content. It is argued that agency will only be possible when moral relativity is overcome. 2012 APA, all rights reserved).

1. Marxism and totalitarian democracy, 1818-1850.--v. 2. Classical Marxism, 1850-1895.

This essay contends that Jonathan Bennett gave a passive reading of conatus, and that he misunderstood Spinoza’s conception of mental representation, mistakenly attributing to Spinoza the common, contemporary view that representational content does not supervene on the intrinsic features of representations. A reading of the conatus as an active, motive principle of opposition is presented. It is argued that Spinoza’s notion of representation is best understood as grounded in a conception of causation on which effects bear intrinsic, distinctive structural marks (...) of their causes. (shrink)